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Autoritarismus in den neuen Staaten Zentralasiens:
Ein Überblick über die politische Entwicklung nach Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 46/1996
Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
Nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR erwartete man, daß sich die neuen unabhängigen Staaten 
Zentralasiens als  instabil  und  anfällig  für  Gewalt  erweisen würden,  doch haben vier  Jahre 
Unabhängigkeit  gezeigt,  daß  sie,  mit  der  Ausnahme Tadschikistans,  zu  den  stabilsten  der 
sowjetischen Nachfolgestaaten gehören. Diejenigen der zentralasiatischen Führer, die den Erhalt 
der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Stabilität für wichtiger als Reformen halten, fühlen sich in 
ihrer Wahl bestätigt. Die Präsidenten Kasachstans und Kirgisiens, die eine Demokratisierung 
versucht haben, wurden ihrerseits zunehmend autoritärer, um die Reformprogramme durchsetzen 
zu können.
Die Notwendigkeit der Stabilität wird dadurch begründet, daß es Zentralasien an Erfahrung mit 
der Demokratie westlichen Stils mangelt und in der Region keine Tradition der Staatlichkeit 
existiert, obwohl die politische und kulturelle Oberschicht dort auch schon vor der Auflösung der 
UdSSR ein gut entwickeltes nationales Bewußtsein besaß.
Westliche Beobachter, die darauf gehofft hatten, daß die Demokratie in Kasachstan und Kirgi-
sien rasch Wurzeln schlagen würde, sahen sich enttäuscht, als die Präsidenten dieser Länder im-
mer autokratischer regierten. Gleichzeitig wuchs das Interesse an Usbekistan trotz beträchtlicher 
Demokratiedefizite  in  dem Maße,  wie der  Westen die  strategische Bedeutung dieses Lanes 
erkannte.
Ergebnisse
1. Die Demokratisierung in Kasachstan erhielt Aufschwung durch die Ereignisse im Dezember 
1986 in Alma-Ata. In den späten 80er Jahren erschienen in Kasachstan die ersten Anzei-
chen einer zivilen Gesellschaft. Es war die erste zentralasiatische Republik, in der öffent-
liche, von der Kommunistischen Partei unabhängige Organisationen wirken durften. Vor 
der Unabhängigkeit Kasachstans hatte sich Nursultan  Nasarbajew den Ruf eines der 
Demokratisierung und wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung verpflichteten Führers erworben. 
Aber  in  den vier  Jahren  der  Unabhängigkeit  zeitigten  die  Reformen auch  negative 
Auswirkungen wie zunehmende soziale Härten und eine wachsende Kriminalitätsrate. 
Die  politischen  Parteien  Kasachstans  sind  im  politischen  Leben  bislang  eher 
bedeutungslos geblieben. Nasarbajew vertrat die Meinung, daß seine Reformen durch das 
Verfassungsgericht und ein unkooperatives Parlament vereitelt worden seien. 1995 löste 
er  dann  das  Parlament  auf  und  herrscht  seither  mittels  Erlasse.  Kasachstans  erste 
nachsowjetische Verfassung wurde durch eine neue ersetzt,  die dem Präsidenten viel 
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mehr  Macht  einräumt,  aber  allgemein  als  undemokratisch  kritisiert  wird.  Der 
kasachische  Präsident  enttäuschte  erneut  alle,  die  ihn  für  einen  Verfechter  der 
Demokratie gehalten hatten, als er seine Amtszeit durch ein Referendum verlängern ließ. 
Da er die gesetzgebende und richterliche Überwachung seiner Macht abgeschafft hat, 
steht Nasarbajew nun in dem Ruf, ein ähnlich autoritärer Herrscher zu sein wie sein 
Nachbar in Usbekistan.
2. Der Präsident Kirgisiens, Askar Akajew, leitete einen Prozeß der Demokratisierung schon 
vor  dem  Auseinanderbrechen  der  UdSSR  ein.  Aber  nachdem  das  Land  seine 
Unabhängigkeit erhalten hatte, geriet der Präsident zunehmend mit dem Parlament in 
Konflikt,  welches nicht  gewillt  war,  seine  Wirtschaftsreformen zu  unterstützen.  Als 
Akajew versuchte, die nichtkirgisischen Minderheiten von der Emigration abzuhalten 
und sie in den neuen Staat zu integrieren, wurde er von den kirgisischen Nationalisten 
angegriffen, die ihn zuvor unterstützt hatten. Der Antagonismus zwischen Präsident und 
Parlament erreichte 1994 einen Höhepunkt, als Akajew die Legislative auflöste. Akajew 
hat auch die Pressefreiheit eingeschränkt und während der Präsidentschaftswahlen von 
1995  eine Herausforderung seiner Macht verhindert.  Seither ist  sein Ruf als ein der 
Demokratisierung verpflichteter Politiker angeschlagen.
3. Usbekistan trat unter einem autoritären Regime in die staatliche Unabhängigkeit ein. Sein 
Präsident, Islam Karimow, stufte Stabilität in der politischen Werteskala höher ein als 
Reformen.  In  Usbekistan  hatte  sich  schon  vor  der  Unabhängigkeit  eine  politische 
Opposition entwickelt,  doch war sie die meiste Zeit über mehr oder weniger starker 
Repression ausgesetzt. Aufgrund von Festnahmen und Prozessen wegen Landesverrats 
hatte Usbekistan im Westen einen schlechten Ruf, der es dem Land schwer machte, 
diplomatische Beziehungen herzustellen. Karimow ist jedoch ein geschickter Politiker, 
und es gelang ihm, westliche Abneigungen bezüglich seiner Menschenrechtsverstöße zu 
überwinden, indem er den Westen in seinen Initiativen gegen den Iran unterstützte und 
eine langsame Privatisierung in Gang setzte, um westliche Investitionen anzulocken.
4. Der Führer Turkmenistans, Saparmurad Nijasow, der sich selbst "Turkmenbaschi" - Vater 
der Turkmenen nennt, hat niemals behauptet, ein Demokrat zu sein. Sein autoritäres Re-
gime und seinen ausufernden Personenkult rechtfertigt er mit dem Hinweis auf orienta-
lische Herrschaftstradition. Politische Opposition gab es in Turkmenistan fast überhaupt 
nicht, so daß eine Demonstration von einigen hundert Menschen in Aschchabat 1995 als 
eine Sensation galt. Nijasow war das erste zentralasiatische Staatsoberhaupt, das sich der 
Notwendigkeit einer Präsidentenwahl entledigte. Dabei konnte er sich ohnehin sicher 
sein, daß die Wähler seinen Wünschen folgen würden.
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5. Tadschikistan lebte die meiste Zeit seiner Unabhängigkeit im Bürgerkrieg. Die wichtigste 
Oppositionspartei, die Islamische Wiedergeburt, führt einen bewaffneten Widerstand gegen 
die Regierung des Präsidenten Imomali  Rachmonow, eines ehemaligen kommunistischen 
Funktionärs, durch. Obwohl die Regierung Rachmonows die Bezeichnung "kommunistisch" 
ablehnt, bleibt die Kommunistische Partei dennoch die beherrschende Kraft in dem von der 
Regierung kontrollierten Teil des Landes. Rachmonow behauptet, er wolle einen säkularen, 
demokratischen Staat  aufbauen, aber der ständige Bürgerkrieg hat  dazu geführt, daß die 
Opposition weiterhin vom politischen Leben Tadschikistans ausgeschlossen bleibt.
New States between Reform and Stabilization
Immediately after the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991 and the appearance of the 
Newly Independent States on the international scene, most Western observers entertained certain 
assumptions about the nature of these states. The new countries of Central Asia, and to a lesser 
extent, of the Caucasus and other regions, were frequently described both by journalists and some 
specialists on the former USSR as having been condemned by their history to instability, prone to 
violence, in the best case authoritarian rule, because they had never experienced the stages of 
development that had led to democracy and a civil society in the West.
Although this assessment of the nature of the problems facing post-Soviet states in creating a civil 
society was largely accurate, the predictions of instability that proceeded from it have proved 
inaccurate. With the exception of Tajikistan, which has been mired in civil war almost since its 
independence, the new countries of Central Asia have proved quite stable. Those Central Asian 
leaders who embarked on the path of independent statehood as authoritarian rulers are convinced 
that their insistence on stability before reform has been justified by events. Those who tried to 
introduce a degree of democratization have become more authoritarian as they found fractious 
legislatures and independent political groups were unwilling to support their modernization and 
privatization plans.
Western assumptions about the inherent instability of the Central Asian successor states were also 
based on a recognition of the weak sense of statehood in these countries and also on the outbreaks 
of violence in all  of the Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan in the late 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s. Most of the newly created countries in Central Asia lacked not only any 
experience with Western-style democracy, but also any experience of statehood prior to their 
creation in the Stalinist national delimitation that accompanied the creation of the Soviet Union 
in the early 1920s. Only Uzbekistan could be said to have had some experience of statehood, if 
the  emirate  of  Bukhara  was  accepted  as  the  direct  ancestor  of  modern  Uzbekistan.  The 
indigenous intellectual  elites in  the  Central  Asian republics developed a  degree of national 
consciousness in the early years of Soviet rule, but this generation was largely lost in the Stalinist 
purges of the non-Russian political and cultural elites in the late 1930s. After World War II, 
national  self-identification  began  to  reassert  itself  among  the  Central  Asian  elite,  despite 
Moscow's efforts to create a "new Soviet man" whose first identity was with the Soviet Union, 
rather than with his ethnic group.
This development was especially pronounced in the Brezhnev "era of stagnation," when in-
digenous Communist Party chiefs and government officials tolerated the strengthening of na-
tional identification among the indigenous intelligentsia under the slogan "national in content, 
socialist in essence." It comes as little surprise, in view of this development, that the Brezhnev-era 
Communist Party chiefs of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Sharaf Rashidov and Dinmuhamed 
Kunaev, are officially regarded in those states as having played major roles in the preparation of 
their countries for independence.
No matter how strong the national identification of the indigenous intellectual and political elites 
in the republics of Central Asia, the indigenous inhabitants of the towns and, to an even greater 
extent, the rural areas, put ties of family, village or locality before identification with their newly-
independent country. Anecdotal evidence from Central Asian intellectuals indicates that many 
rural inhabitants took months, if not years, to register that the Soviet Union no longer existed and 
that they were now citizens of a new country. The weakness of the sense of nationhood in these 
states has also played a role in strengthening the inclination toward authoritarianism that the 
governing elites inherited from their Soviet upbringing.
As foreign perceptions of individual Central Asian countries began to take form, it was noted that 
both  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  were  led  by  men  who  seemed to  be  committed  to  the 
democratization and Westernization of their  societies. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan,  while  paying  some  lip-service  to  eventual  democratization,  were  clearly  of  an 
authoritarian bent, which affected the willingness of the West to develop close ties with them, 
although Western businessmen valued the stability that characterized the political life of these 
countries. Tajikistan's leadership during most of the period of the country's independence, while 
characterized by authoritarianism, has had to function in conditions of utmost instability, and has 
never been able to assert its control over the entire country.
Western expectations that democracy would develop rapidly and painlessly in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan were unrealistic, and have led to considerable disappointment and some cooling of 
Western interest in these countries. At the same time that foreign disillusion with these states has 
risen, interest in the admittedly authoritarian Uzbekistan has increased. Foreign observers often 
seem to forget that all Central Asian leaders want to maintain and strengthen their hold on power, 
because, rightly or wrongly, they believe the future of their countries depends on the realization 
of their programs for modernization, development and the creation of a sense of statehood. All of 
these leaders have had different ideas on the best way to achieve these goals. The following study 
is an overview of political developments in each country that have led to the authoritarianism that 
now characterizes political life in all the Central Asian states.
Kazakhstan
Background to liberalization
In December 1986, young Kazakhs staged a protest demonstration in the square facing the main 
government building in the capital, Alma-Ata, to protest the "parachuting in" to the republic of a 
Russian Communist Party chief who had had no previous ties with Kazakhstan. The practice of 
sending non-indigenous Communist Party leaders into the non-Russian republics had been widely 
practised by the authorities in Moscow from the 1930s onward. Kazakhstan, in which no ethnic 
group had clear dominance since the Virgin Lands development project in the 1950s had brought 
thousands of non-Kazakhs into the republic, had had a  series of Moscow-selected Party and 
government leaders who were Russians or other non-Kazakhs.
Most notable among them was probably Leonid Brezhnev, who in his memoirs indicated a 
striking lack of sympathy for Kazakh national feelings but among whose closest friends in the 
republic was the Kazakh mining engineer, Dinmuhamed Kunaev. Thanks to Kunaev's friendship 
with Brezhnev, the Kazakh spent over twenty years as the ruler of the republic, during which 
time  he  looked  the  other  way  as  Kazakh  national  consciousness  grew  among  Kazakh 
intellectuals. Kunaev had been a fixture in the republic's political life for so long that it came as a 
severe shock to Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs alike when Mikhail Gorbachev, insensitive to the 
extent to which national consciousness and ethnic pride had developed in all parts of the USSR, 
appointed Gennady Kolbin to revitalize Kazakhstan's declining economy.
Despite the investigative efforts of government commissions both before and after Kazakhstan 
gained its independence, accounts differ on how violence erupted during the December 1986 
demonstration in Alma-Ata. Young people who made up the bulk of the demonstrators insist that 
they were staging a peaceful sit-in in the square and were attacked by law-enforcement officials. 
At the time, government officials charged that at least some of the Kazakh demonstrators had 
displayed anti-Russian slogans and had attacked Russians in the streets. Whatever the truth about 
the course of events, the events in Alma-Ata were a great shock to Gorbachev and the liberalizers 
in Moscow, forcing them to see interethnic relations as a main focal point of political tensions 
within the USSR.
In retrospect, the events of December 1986 in Alma-Ata have been canonized as Kazakhstan's 
first step toward independence from Moscow, and Kolbin is widely condemned by Kazakhs for 
trying to reverse the gains made in the development of national consciousness during Kunaev's 
rule. In fact, the Russian Party chief attempted to balance the interests of the different ethnic 
groups in Kazakhstan, focusing more attention on the teaching of the Kazakh language than it 
had received under the supposedly nationally-minded Kunaev. Although Kazakh intellectuals 
look back with great bitterness on Kolbin's few years in Kazakhstan, it was during this time that 
the first signs of the advent of a civil society began to appear, as the Communist Party press 
began to explore formerly forbidden topics such as public opinion and the effects of the famine 
caused by Stalin's collectivization drive in the early 1930s.
One of the most notable signs of the advent of political liberalization was the founding of the 
Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement, which had as its goal the stopping of nuclear 
weapons testing at the Soviet army's test site in Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk Oblast. The move-
ment's founder, Kazakh nationalist poet Olzhas Suleimenov, hoped to enlist the aid of the po-
litically-experienced US anti-nuclear movement, hence the inclusion of Nevada in the organi-
zation's name. Nevada-Semipalatinsk was the first public organization in Kazakhstan that was 
not controlled by the Communist Party, and as such it represented the first stirring of civil society 
in Central Asia. Suleimenov, who probably already had political ambitions, was careful to stress 
that the group united Kazakhs and Russians, because both of Kazakhstan's major ethnic groups 
had suffered the effects of the Soviet testing program.
Kolbin, stung by his reception in Kazakhstan and mindful of Gorbachev's calls for the liberali-
zation of Soviet society, actively supported the anti-nuclear movement despite its criticism of the 
Soviet military establishment. When the Russian Party chief was finally replaced by a Kazakh, 
prime minister Nursultan Nazarbaev, the stage had already been set for the appearance of a wide 
spectrum of political organizations, ranging by 1991  from tiny Kazakh nationalist groupings 
such  as  Alash,  which  called  for  the  expulsion  of  Russians  and  other  non-Muslims  from 
Kazakhstan, to the moderate Kazakh nationalist Azat and a variety of groups representing Slavic 
interests in the republic. Alash and another small Kazakh group called Zheltoqsan (December) 
that agitated for the rehabilitation of those arrested after the events of December 1986 in Alma-
Ata, were regularly harassed by the authorities and refused official recognition, but were not 
actively repressed.1
Independent Kazakhstan
When Kazakhstan declared its independence in December, 1991,  in  the wake of the Soviet 
collapse, Nazarbaev, who by then held the newly-created post of president, had already gained a 
reputation as one of the more liberal statesmen in the former USSR. This reputation, which he 
enjoyed both at home and abroad, was based largely on his enthusiastic support for the economic 
1 See V.A. Ponomarev, Obshchestvenniye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane. Alma-Ata: Glagol, 1991, 
and B. Brown, "Informal Groups in Kazakhstan," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, December 1, 1988.
reform projects of Gorbachev and his more liberal advisers, as well as on Nazarbaev's active 
promotion of the replacement of the USSR by a voluntary union of republics in which none 
dominated. The fact that Gorbachev's twin principles of glasnost and perestroika were making 
headway in Kazakhstan, when they had hardly been felt anywhere else in Central Asia except 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan, also contributed to the image of Nazarbaev as a liberal leader.
As a Russian interviewer commented at the end of 1995, for the first few years of Kazakhstan's 
independent existence, Nazarbaev was widely perceived to be the most democratic leader in 
Central Asia.2 By 1996, however, the Kazakh president's actions in the political arena had called 
into question his commitment to establishing Western-style democracy in Kazakhstan, and his 
disappointed admirers in the West were prepared to see him as an authoritarian leader little 
different from his counterpart in Uzbekistan. Nazarbaev remained, however, determined to create 
a  market economy in Kazakhstan as quickly as possible. Nazarbaev himself denied that  his 
intention to see Kazakhstan become a functioning democracy had weakened, but he defended the 
need for a strong executive power to ensure that his reform program was carried out and to gain 
the upper hand over rising levels of crime.
The beginnings of a political life outside Communist Party control, Nazarbaev's active promotion 
of economic reforms aimed at  the rapid creation of a  market  economy, and an increasingly 
independent press created the impression, even before the collapse of the USSR, that Kazakhstan 
was on the path to Western-style democracy. But political groups seeking to protect the interests 
of the country's large Slavic population assert that laws prohibiting actions that  could incite 
interethnic violence are more strictly applied to them than to Kazakh groups. Kazakhstan's rulers 
have had considerable success in keeping the lid on interethnic tensions, while presiding over a 
growing imbalance in  the  number  of  Kazakhs  in  government jobs or  in  the  legislature  in 
comparison with their numbers in the country's population. By the beginning of 1996, only nine 
government ministers out of 21 were not ethnic Kazakhs, according to Nazarbaev, while the 
Kazakh share of the country's population was 50%.3 The Russian share had declined to 32%, but 
even so there was no question but that Russians were underrepresented in the corridors of power.
Nazarbaev's economic reform program, which envisaged the rapid introduction of a  market 
economy, with large-scale foreign investment and assistance from international  financial  or-
ganizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, was initiated at the same 
time that the republic's economy was feeling the effects of the rupture of Soviet-era economic ties. 
The result was disruption of an economy that had already been in decline in 1986 when Kunaev 
was removed. Social suffering associated with the failure of the Soviet-era safety net and the 
appearance of widespread unemployment led to  an  increase in  street crime.  Nazarbaev has 
designated a rising level of crime generally as one of the most serious threats to the country, and 
used the need to reestablish law and order as an excuse for increasingly arbitrary rule.
Despite Kazakhstan's early start in developing independent political groups and relatively inde-
pendent information media, the parties and other political groups have proved largely irrelevant 
in the political process.4 Kazakhstan's legislature, the Supreme Soviet, allowed the creation of 
party fractions, but there has been little evidence of party discipline. The largest parties, the 
People's  Congress  of  Olzhas  Suleimenov  and  the  People's  Unity,  considered  the  party  of 
2 Argumenty i fakty, No. 51, December 1995, p. 3.
3 Ibid.
4 See the assessment of the founder of the moderate Kazakh nationalist Azat Party in Kazakhstanskiye novosti, 
July 2, 1994.
Nazarbaev, are widely seen as little more than vehicles for the political ambitions of their lead-
ers.5
Already in the first year of independence, Nazarbaev found that some aspects of the civil society 
were not entirely to his liking. While Westerners were urging the government of Kazakhstan to 
respect the concept of a state ruled by law, the country's very independent Constitutional Court 
was taking its tasks seriously, and routinely striking down the president's decrees on grounds that 
they violated the constitution. In early 1996, the court was rocked by charges that its chairman 
had taken a huge bribe. The charge has served to discredit the court and weaken its position vis-ŕ-
vis the government, as represented by the Ministry of Justice.6
In 1994, a new parliament was elected under the first post-Soviet constitution and election laws. 
The political parties complained that they had great difficulty registering their nominees, but 
despite discussions in the press of the validity of the charges, there was little evidence that jthe 
population had much interest in what party politicians charged was a violation of democratic 
standards.7 Nazarbaev was infuriated when the leader of a delegation of election observers from 
the European Union cast doubt on the fairness of the election because of reports of widespread 
irregularities in the nomination process and in the actual voting. Voters were obliged to cast votes 
for candidates on a special list hand-picked by the president, in addition to candidates nominated 
by parties or other public organizations.
Despite the presidential tampering with the election process, Nazarbaev found the new legislature 
was little more pliant than its Soviet-era predecessor. It too was unwilling to approve economic 
reform packages proposed by the  government if  they seemed likely  to  worsen the  already 
desperate situation of many of the country's citizens. There was no deadlock between president 
and parliament  because  the  desires of parliament  were largely ignored by the  government, 
although Prime Minister Tereshchenko went through the motions of seeking the approval of the 
Supreme Soviet,  which as one of its first orders of business attempted to remove him. The 
deputies had to be reminded by Nazarbaev that they did not have the right to remove the prime 
minister. The president later tried to defuse popular dissatisfaction with the economic reforms by 
removing Tereshchenko, ostensibly because he had not been able to show positive results with 
the reforms, and replaced him with the Kazakh Akezhan Kazhegeldin.
In March 1995, the Constitutional Court precipitated Kazakhstan's first constitutional crisis by 
announcing that the parliamentary elections had violated the law, and ruled that the results were 
invalid.8 Nazarbaev called on the deputies to resign and most did so without complaint. Olzhas 
Suleimenov attempted to organize resistance to the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, but his 
effort was seen as an attempt at self-promotion with an eye to the presidential election scheduled 
for 1996, and he found little support among the deputies or outside the parliament.
5 In a rambling report to the party leadership in December 1994, Suleimenov described the party's goals as the 
promotion of democratization and economic reform, with no real difference between it and the other major 
party. Suleimenov himself was sharply criticized in the Almaty press for permitting the commercialization of 
the anti-nuclear movement, of which he was still  the head, though he gave little attention to it.  See Ogni 
Alatau, No. 23, March 1994.
6 Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 10,1996 and Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 6, 1996.
7 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, January 13, 1994.
8 The court defended what some observers saw as its self-destructive decision by pointing out that if the country 
was to have a rule of law, the courts had to strictly uphold the law. See Kazakhstanskaya pravda, March 14, 
1995 and Karavan, March 17, 1995.
Nazarbaev took the opportunity to rule by decree without the inconvenience of having to deal 
with a recalcitrant legislature.9 Among the first decrees he issued after the dissolution of the 
Supreme Soviet were several  dealing with the struggle against  crime, under which heading 
restrictions on demonstrations and rallies were put into force. These included a requirement that 
hunger strikers should obtain official permission for their strikes.
Another decree limited the types of advertising that could appear in publications, putting further 
pressure on the independent information media.10
Of particular disappointment for those who still thought that Nazarbaev had the makings of a 
liberal leader was his agreement soon after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet with the pro-
posal of an Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, a body appointed by himself, that his term of 
office be extended to the end of 2000.  Although some suggested that Nazarbaev might have 
feared that he would lose the presidential election that should have been held in 1996, political 
observers in Kazakhstan and ordinary citizens alike agreed that Suleimenov did not have the 
popular support to mount a  credible challenge to the incumbent president. The president had 
simply lost patience with the limited democracy that had been tried in Kazakhstan, and found it 
easier to rule by decree. When the proposal to extend Nazarbaev's term was put to a referendum, 
over 95% of the country's voters approved.
In December 1995, Nazarbaev defended the extension of his term as a necessary first step toward 
the promulgation of a new, and in his view, more effective constitution. He argued that a strong 
executive is  not harmful to  democracy,  insisting that  Kazakhstan needed a  presidency with 
enhanced powers in order to push through the economic reform that the elected legislature had 
hampered, and to conduct the fight against rising levels of crime.11
The president's replacement of Kazakhstan's first post-Soviet constitution with a second that was 
more to his liking resulted in demonstrations by the political opposition in July 1995, protesting 
that the new constitution gave too much power to the executive branch. Six of the ten judges on 
the  Constitutional  Court  sent  a  letter  to  Nazarbaev,  characterizing the  new constitution  as 
inimical to the creation of a civil society.12 Critics of the new constitution asserted that it did away 
with  any  effective  checks  and  balances between the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of 
government, and abolished any hope for an independent judiciary. Others argued that there was 
no need for a  new constitution so soon after the adoption of the first,  because the existing 
constitution provided an adequate framework for any reform program.13
The Kazakh nationalist leader of the tiny Zheltoqsan party, Hasen Kozhahmetov, condemned the 
new basic law as destroying democracy in the country, and leaders of Lad, the most prominent 
organization seeking to protect the interests of Kazakhstan's Russian population, described it as a 
regression from the first constitution because it limited civil liberties and failed to give official 
status to the Russian language.
While the press remains relatively free, at least in the capital, printing facilities are still largely in 
the hands of the government, forcing editors to engage in a degree of self-censorship to avoid 
losing access to presses. In 1994, Kazakhstan's most popular weekly, Karavan, had to be printed 
in  Bishkek,  the  capital  of  neighboring Kyrgyzstan  and  only a  four-hour  bus journey from 
9 Financial Times, March 17, 1995.
10 Handelsblatt, March 14, 1995 and Reuters, March 22, 1995.
11 Argumenty i fakty, No. 51, December 1995, p. 3.
12 Interfax, June 12, 1995.
13 Sovety Kazakhstana, February 28, 1995.
Almaty, because the newspaper's coverage of a  scandal involving the mayor of Almaty drew 
government wrath.
In 1995, a Russian-language publication of Kazakh nationalist bent called Kazakhskaya pravda 
was closed down and its editor charged with inciting interethnic hatred. The publication was back 
on Almaty news-stands in 1996, but this episode could not but have a chilling effect on press 
independence in Kazakhstan.
Given the ethnic makeup of Kazakhstan's population, the avoidance of interethnic tensions has 
had top priority for the country's government. Groups representing the interests of the Cossacks 
whose ancestors took a major role in establishing Russian rule in what is now Kazakhstan in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been routinely refused the possibility of registering as 
public organizations with the Ministry of Justice, and have been refused permits to demonstrate 
in Almaty on the grounds that the Kazakh population finds their activities disturbing.14 Groups 
representing the interests of the Russian population routinely complain that they suffer greater 
harassment from law enforcement agencies than do Kazakh nationalist groups.15
Laws prohibiting the incitement of hatred between ethnic groups have been used, as in the 
Kazakhskaya pravda affair, to limit the speech of those whose political views the governing elite 
finds uncomfortable. It has also been used to limit criticism by ethnic Russians of policies they 
believe threaten  their  interests  as  a  group.  In  May  1994,  Boris  Suprunyuk,  editor  of  an 
independent Russian-language newspaper in Northern Kazakhstan, was arrested and charged 
with incitement of interethnic tensions. The chairman of an umbrella organization of Russian-
interests societies threatened to rescue Suprunyuk  from jail  by force.16 The threat was never 
carried out, but it signalled that interethnic relations were worsening in Kazakhstan despite the 
efforts of the government.
While democratization was losing out in the political arena, privatization and other market-
oriented  reforms  appeared  to  be  making  some  headway,  although  Kazakhstan's  economic 
managers were unable to reverse the effects of the post-Soviet economic malaise to a sufficient 
degree for an improvement in the economy to be visible. Ordinary citizens had little hope that 
their lives would improve in the foreseeable future, and had little interest in politics.
Although Nazarbaev appeared to find rule by decree very congenial, he permitted a new legis-
lature to be elected under the new constitution in late 1995.  Foreign observers assessed this 
election as even less democratic than the one in 1994. Although its opening session, at the end of 
January 1996, was attended by the demonstration that has become a staple of legislative life in 
Kazakhstan, the deputies are unlikely to be able to mount an effective challenge to the president, 
should they desire to do so. Few well-known political figures were elected to the new body, and 
the new constitution so restricted its powers that it has only half-jokingly been described as "the 
legislative department of the president's staff."17 As Nazarbaev told an interviewer from a Russian 
television network  on  the  day  the  first  parliamentary  session opened,  the  new constitution 
provided him with the means to influence the legislative process, and he had every intention of 
using them.18
14 Interfax, November 21 and 29, 1994, and article "Qazaqtar men Kazaktar" (Kazakhs and Cossacks) in Kazakh-
language weekly Turkestan, No. 3, January 1995.
15 Kontinent, No. 52, 1995.
16 ITAR-TASS, May 18, 1994.
17 Izvestiya, February 2, 1996.
18 NTV news show "Today," January 30, 1996. See also Segodnya, February 1, 1996.
Despite the president's stated belief that he could control the new legislature, he decided not to 
put to the test the issue of seeking the deputies' approval of private ownership of land, preferring 
to introduce it by decree in early January before the parliament met.19 Nazarbaev himself had 
rejected private landownership in the early stages of his reform program, on the grounds that 
private ownership would endanger the lifestyle of the traditionally nomadic Kazakhs, who might 
find their summer pastures bought up by Russians, thereby exacerbating relations between the 
two ethnic groups.
In any case, Nazarbaev's decree on private landownership fell short of creating a real market in 
land, because it prohibited the use of private land for the construction of industrial enterprises or 
office buildings, nor could land be alienated from its use at the time of sale, that is, agricultural 
land had to remain agricultural. As a step toward the creation of a market economy, the decree on 
privatization of land is a half-hearted measure at best.
The constitution gave the president the right to name the speakers of the two houses of the new 
parliament, and soon after the session opened, one of them commented that deputies could form 
groupings in opposition to the government, but it would be unacceptable for the entire legislature 
to oppose the government. So there would be no parliamentary investigation of such potentially 
inflammatory  issues  as  the  question  of  how  the  government  was  using  foreign  credits.20 
Nazarbaev had succeeded in eliminating legislative and judicial checks on his power, and was 
perceived both inside Kazakhstan and abroad as an authoritarian leader who had abandoned the 
road to democratization.
Kyrgyzstan
As Mikhail Gorbachev's loosening of controls began to spread into the Soviet hinterlands in the 
late 1980s, the Communist Party chief of Kyrgyzstan, Absamat Masaliev, not only prevented 
liberalization from reaching his republic, but also fought perestroika and glasnost at the source 
in Moscow. His vehement attacks in the USSR Supreme Soviet against the weakening of the 
Soviet control structure earned all Kyrgyzstan the scorn of Moscow liberals.
But this perception was reversed in October 1990, when Masaliev, following the lead of other 
republican Communist Party chiefs, persuaded Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet to institute the post 
of president of the republic. Of course, Masaliev wanted the position for himself, but the Supreme 
Soviet deputies refused to elect him, most likely in reaction to his inept response to the fighting 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan's southern Osh Oblast in June of that year. The "Osh 
events," in which dozens and possibly hundreds of people lost their lives, were a major trauma for 
the inhabitants of the placid mountain republic, and during investigations of their cause evidence 
emerged indicating that Masaliev and his hard-line leadership team had been warned beforehand 
that friction over land and water rights were building between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh 
region, Kyrgyzstan's part of the fertile but overpopulated Fergana Valley that was divided in the 
national delimitation between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The compromise candidate who received the newly-created post of president was Askar Akaev, a 
physicist who had been chosen not long before to head Kyrgyzstan's Academy of Sciences. 
Subsequent claims, in Russia and the West, that Akaev is the only Central Asian head of state 
who was never a Communist Party official are incorrect: prior to his selection for the Academy of 
Sciences post he had served as republican Communist Party secretary for science and education. 
19 Izvestiya, January 4, 1996.
20 Russian TV news, February 4, 1996.
But Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian republic in which the president prior to the collapse of 
the USSR was not at the same time head of the republican Communist Party.21
Immediately after his election, Akaev let it be known that radical changes were coming in Kyr-
gyzstan. He called for rapid economic and political reform, encouraged liberalization in repub-
lican information media, and declared his commitment to the establishment of Western-style 
democracy. Intellectuals in neighboring republics soon announced that they too wanted a leader 
like Akaev.
Kyrgyzstan's Communists were outraged at Akaev's loosing of perestroika and glasnost in the 
republic, and during the attempted coup by Communist hard-liners in Moscow in August, 1991, 
a  mini-coup was attempted against  Akaev. He easily thwarted it  with the assistance of the 
republican KGB chief, and used the opportunity to break the power of Kyrgyzstan's Communist 
Party.
A month before the disintegration of the USSR, Akaev was in Washington, outlining to US 
President George Bush and the US Congress his plans for turning Kyrgyzstan into "the Swit-
zerland of Central Asia," with foreign help. So impressed were the Americans with his presen-
tations that Kyrgyzstan soon became one of the main Central Asian recipients of US foreign aid.
As economic ties between republics dissolved after the Soviet collapse, Kyrgyzstan suffered more 
than many of the new states from the disruption, and had little choice but to seek assistance from 
Western financial  institutions and  foreign investors.  Although the country possesses natural 
resources that could be exploited, outside partners are needed to develop them. Akaev's plan was 
to  make  the  remote,  undeveloped  country  attractive  to  investors  through  rapid  economic 
liberalization and democratization.
He soon discovered, however, that political liberalization does not necessarily ensure support for 
a market economy. The independent press in Bishkek analyzed and criticized every action of the 
government. The political parties that had begun forming even before the country gained its 
independence wrangled among themselves over whether to support Akaev or act  as a  loyal 
opposition. Fractions formed in the parliament and shifted from support of the government to 
opposition and back, depending on the issue at hand. The Supreme Soviet inherited from the 
Soviet era was in general, however, far more conservative than the president.
And Akaev, whose commitment to the establishment of a Western-style democracy as he un-
derstood it, discovered the truth of the adage that democracy is very messy. The Supreme Soviet 
sought to limit or block most of Akaev's sweeping plans to transform the command economy of 
the Soviet era  into a  market-based system, and many of the parties questioned his reforms 
because of their negative effects on the standard of living of the population. Lacking experience 
of  self-imposed discipline  in  public  discourse,  deputies  and  party  leaders  alike  engaged in 
intemperate attacks on Akaev and the government, accusing various officials and the president's 
family of corruption, and questioning Akaev's commitment to democratization.22
The trauma of the events in Osh in 1990,  when ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks slaughtered each 
other, proved no damper to a rising Kyrgyz national self-assertiveness that disturbed many of the 
non-Kyrgyz third of the country's population and that found expression in the free press. Many 
Russians, Germans and other non-Kyrgyz emigrated from the country, taking their desperately 
needed professional, administrative, industrial and even agricultural skills with them. Akaev tried 
21 Prior to the disintegration of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan was known under its Russian name, Kirgizia.
22 For example, Svobodniye gory, July 23, 1993, and Respublika, January 7, 1994, and attacks on Akaev by the 
leaders  of  the  Society for  Protection  of  Human Rights  and  the  Erkin  Kyrgyzstan  Party in  Respublika, 
February 28, 1995. 
to stop the haemorrhage of non-Kyrgyz experts by opening a Slavonic University in Bishkek and 
taking other measures to assure non-Kyrgyz that there was a future for them in Kyrgyzstan, but 
his  efforts  brought  limited  success.  He  was,  however,  severely  criticized  by  the  Kyrgyz 
nationalists who had supported him at the time of his election in 1990. These groups successfully 
blocked Akaev's efforts to make Russian a state language on a par with Kyrgyz.
Antagonism between Akaev and the parliament came to a  head in 1994,  when the deputies 
succeeded in forcing the president to dismiss his reform-minded prime minister, interpreting the 
premier's support for a joint venture with a Canadian company to develop as Kyrgyz gold mine 
as a sell-out of the country's natural wealth. The new prime minister, Apas Dzhumagulov, had 
been the last Soviet premier of the republic, and apparently the conservative deputies believed 
that he would try to slow down the pace of reform.
Akaev retaliated by publicly attacking the Supreme Soviet as a relic of the Soviet past. In July 
1994, shortly after the president told a gathering of judicial officials that much of the information 
media in Kyrgyzstan demonstrated their irresponsibility by stirring up political and interethnic 
conflicts, a Bishkek court closed down the parliamentary newspaper. Other publications raised a 
clamor about what they described as an assault on democracy, and more than half the Supreme 
Soviet deputies then refused to attend a final session of the legislature that was to set a date for 
the next parliamentary election.
Akaev responded by dissolving the Supreme Soviet, scheduling a referendum on his proposal for 
changing the structure of the legislature from one chamber to two, and setting a date for the next 
parliamentary election himself. The president later commented that the political turmoil was only 
helping the restored Communist Party,  which he feared would win the election in February, 
1995. In the event, no party gained a clear dominance of the legislature in the elections. The 
Communist Party, the deputies of which include two former republican party chiefs, formed its 
own fraction and now claims to take pride in functioning as a genuine parliamentary opposition. 
Although the political parties are somewhat more influential in the political life of Kyrgyzstan 
than is the case with the political parties in Kazakhstan, the Western concept of a ruling party and 
an opposition party or parties has not yet been realized.
Western disappointment with Akaev had been growing even before his clashes with the old 
Supreme Soviet, fueled partly by the slow pace of economic reform despite the president's plans 
for rapid change, and partly by the charges of Akaev's opponents that the president himself was 
undermining the democracy he himself had introduced. Between the first and second rounds of 
voting in the 1995 parliamentary election, a conference of political parties in Bishkek called on 
Akaev to delay the second round until charges of electoral fraud raised after the first round had 
been investigated. Akaev refused, leading to further charges that he was not the democrat that 
many had believed him to be.
Domestic and foreign belief in Akaev's commitment to democracy was further shaken at the time 
of the presidential election in December, 1995, when manipulation by the electoral commission 
led to Akaev's challenger, former parliament speaker Medetkan Sherimkulov, being denied a 
place on the ballot. Akaev almost certainly would have won the election anyway, so it  was 
unclear what he hoped to gain from the fraudulent election, which he must have known would 
alienate his Western supporters.
Despite Kyrgyzstan's apparent faltering on the road to democratization, an inspection of news-
stands in Bishkek reveals that the press remains relatively free, but the closures of newspapers in 
1994  has left its mark in the more cautious tone taken by editors. The major restriction on 
Kyrgyzstan's information media is, however, financial: like most institutions in the country, lack 
of funding is a major constraint.23 The cost of paper alone can be prohibitive. As in Kazakhstan, 
printing facilities remain in government ownership, making it easier for the authorities to enforce 
actions such as the 1994  closure of the parliamentary daily and the independent newspaper 
Respublika, the editor of which was accused of irresponsible journalism.
The real limit on democratization in Kyrgyzstan is most likely to be the country's economic 
situation.24 If foreign aid and investment can stop the decline, democratization may resume with a 
stronger base than was the case in the first years of independence. If the country's situation does 
not improve, then social and interethnic tensions could wipe out all that Akaev has achieved.
Uzbekistan
While Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, has said that democratization is his distant goal, he 
has not sought to present himself as a  committed democrat as have Kyrgyzstan's Akaev and 
Kazakhstan's Nazarbaev. The last Soviet-era chief of Uzbekistan's Communist Party, Karimov 
has remained true to his training in the Soviet authoritarian tradition, preserving more of the 
Soviet-era structure of rule than has been the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In the wake of 
the Moscow coup in August 1991, Uzbekistan's Communist Party was not banned or restricted, 
as was the case in most other Soviet republics, but merely changed its name and adopted some 
nationalist  trappings to  appeal  to  the  upsurge  in  national  consciousness that  intensified in 
Uzbekistan after independence was declared in September 1991.25
The Communist Party remains largely intact as the Popular Democratic Party, of which Karimov 
is the leading spirit. He has adopted the practice of paying lip-service to Islam as the moral code 
on which Uzbek statehood is based; at his inauguration after his re-election to the presidency in 
December 1991, he took his oath of office on the Koran. But Karimov's discovery of his own and 
his country's  Muslim roots has not  prevented him from ensuring that  Uzbekistan's Muslim 
religious establishment is under firm government control.
Karimov has justified his refusal to embark on political liberalization, and the slow pace of eco-
nomic reform in Uzbekistan, by warning of the danger of violence if the lid is removed too 
rapidly.  He  can  support  his  arguments  by  citing  the  bloody  assaults  by  Uzbeks  against 
Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley in 1989 and demonstrations in Tashkent in January 
1992 by students protesting the freeing of prices. And, although Uzbekistan's strictly-controlled 
press no longer discusses issues that  were pressing in the last  years of Soviet rule,  such as 
population pressure  on arable  land,  water  rights,  environmental  degradation and  associated 
health problems, even the disruption of children's schooling so they can help out with the cotton 
harvest, these problems remain unsolved and potentially explosive.
In the late 1980s, political opposition groups calling for a type of Western-style democracy began 
to appear in Uzbekistan. The most prominent of these were the moderate Uzbek nationalist Birlik 
(Unity) Movement, and a small group calling itself the Erk Democratic Party, founded by the 
writer Muhammad Salih after a disagreement with Birlik leaders over the question of whether the 
use of force could be justified to advance a democratic program. Birlik's leadership refused to 
reject the use of force in all circumstances. Despite the disagreement between the two groups on 
this issue, they cooperated closely with each other in the face of official hostility.
23 See Eric Johnson, "The Media in Central Asia," an analysis conducted by Internews for USAID, April 1994.
24 See Slovo Kyrgyzstana, March 18, 1995.
25 Pravda Vostoka, September 15 and October 20, 1991.
Both organizations were harassed by the authorities, who interfered with the distribution of the 
two groups' publications and occasionally detained party activists although Erk was at  least 
allowed to register as a  legal opposition party and even to run Salih against Karimov in the 
presidential election of December, 1991. The opposition leader won 12% of the vote in what was 
the freest election Uzbekistan had ever had, and the result gave a fair indication of the extent of 
popular  support for a  non-Communist opposition. Birlik  was refused official  registration on 
various pretexts,  probably because it  was much larger  than  Erk  and was perceived by the 
republic's leadership as a greater potential threat.
Birlik was able to organize demonstrations in Tashkent in support of state language status for 
Uzbek that drew thousands of participants. As Moscow's control over Uzbekistan weakened, the 
Uzbek leadership paid Birlik  the compliment of adopting many of the points in its program 
calling for greater protection of Uzbek national interests, including an enhanced official role for 
the Uzbek language and for greater official recognition that Uzbekistan is a part of the Islamic 
world.26 Birlik  has  not,  however,  espoused Muslim  fundamentalism.  It  has  been pro-Islam 
because this orientation was believed to be a necessary aspect of being pro-Uzbek.
Uzbekistan's leadership was and remains adamantly opposed to political groupings, particularly 
Muslim ones, based on religion. The country's post-Soviet constitution prohibits political parties 
based on religious principles, continuing the official hostility shown to Muslim groups that were 
not  under  the  control  of  the  official  Islamic  establishment,  before  Uzbekistan  became 
independent. A rather loose grouping with a Muslim religious orientation that appeared in the 
Fergana Valley in the late 1980s, was suppressed for being an expression of Muslim fundamen-
talism, and an attempt to set up a branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan brought 
an immediate ban.27 In March 1992,  at  a  time when Karimov was being uncharacteristically 
tolerant  of  secular  opposition groups,  leaders of  the  Islamic  Renaissance Party  were being 
arrested.28
Karimov's heightened tolerance toward the opposition in the first months of 1992 was apparently 
motivated by his desire to enlist as many Western-oriented intellectuals as possible to support his 
vision of the direction that Uzbekistan should take in order to establish its place in the world. 
Most of the country's intelligentsia, delighted with the country's unexpected independence, were 
already in agreement with Karimov's call for Uzbekistan to be recognized as the most important 
state in Central Asia and the region's natural leader. Their criticism of Karimov's human rights 
record was somewhat muted, as though in response to Karimov's plea that political stability had 
to come before political innovation. In return, Birlik and Erk were permitted to distribute their 
publications and both groups experienced a surge in membership.
Karimov's honeymoon with the organized opposition ended only a few months after it began, 
when a coalition government, including members of the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party and 
democratic and nationalist groups, was set up in neighboring Tajikistan. Karimov declared that 
Tajikistan's new government would turn the country into a hotbed of Muslim fundamentalism, 
and threw his support to those politicians in that country who sought to crush the nationalist-
democratic-Islamic opposition by force.29 At the same time, the Uzbek president used the pretext 
26 See Karimov's statements about the Uzbek national heritage in Pravda Vostoka, September 24, 1994.
27 The Islamic Renaissance Party was founded by Muslims in Russia in 1990. Representatives of the Central 
Asian republics  were invited to  the  founding congress.  See Daniil  Mikul'skij,  Die Islamische Partei  der 
Wiedergeburt,  Berichte des  Bundesinstituts  fuer ostwissenschaftliche and internationale Studien,  No.  22, 
1993.
28 Ibid.
29 Halq sozi, April 1, 1993.
of stopping the spread of Muslim fundamentalism from Tajikistan to clamp down on opposition 
parties  at  home.  Although  Birlik  and  Erk  retained  their  status  as  officially  registered 
organizations for a time, numerous arrests of activists occurred, and the publishing activities of 
the two groups were suppressed. Several prominent human rights activists and opposition leaders, 
including Salih, went into exile in Turkey or the West.
When  Western  human  rights  groups  criticized  Karimov's  treatment  of  the  opposition,  he 
countered with the demonstrably false claim that Birlik and Erk espoused Muslim fundamental-
ism. Uzbek officials asserted that the two opposition groups had not been banned but had failed 
to reregister as public organizations. This falsehood on the part of the government was especially 
egregious because the Tashkent police had turned the opposition groups out of their headquarters 
shortly  before  the  deadline  for  reregistration,  so  that  they  would  be  unable  to  meet  the 
requirement of providing an address.
Between 1992 to 1995 the Uzbek government remained highly repressive toward any opposition, 
which seriously damaged the country's reputation in the West, as the result of the seizures by 
Uzbek security officials of opposition leaders on the streets of neighboring countries as well 
keeping up steady pressure on the domestic opposition through arrests, treason trials and beat-
ings. Liberal Russian journalists frequently criticized Karimov's authoritarianism, and issues of 
Russian newspapers that contained critical articles would usually be seized by the Uzbek police 
before they could be put on sale in Tashkent. Working conditions for foreign journalists became 
so bad that Western news agencies moved their offices to Almaty, which was a sharp blow to 
Uzbek prestige.30 More serious for Uzbekistan, many Western aid-givers and potential investors 
backed away from Uzbekistan, not only because of its poor human rights record, but also because 
economic and legal reforms had made almost no headway. Thanks to Karimov's insistence on 
maintaining political stability by repressive means, Uzbekistan was finding itself more and more 
isolated.
In 1994, Karimov's former Vice President Shukrullo Mirsaidov attempted to take over leadership 
of the opposition within Uzbekistan, but  veteran members of Birlik  and Erk  questioned the 
genuineness of his commitment to their human rights principles and tended to shun him. Despite 
this lack of acceptance, Mirsaidov continues to describe himself as the leader of the Uzbek 
opposition.31
The election for a new parliament, the Olii Majlis (Supreme Assembly), in December 1994 was 
described by Karimov as a multi-party election because a handful of parties that had been set up 
by individuals loyal to the president were allowed to put up candidates along with Karimov's 
Popular Democratic Party, the renamed Communists. These spurious opposition parties attracted 
little popular support, and only one of them, Vatan tarakkiyati (Fatherland Progress), won a few 
seats in the new parliament.32 There was no question that the legislature, despite the presence of 
an opposition, would not mount a serious challenge to the president's wishes.
In February 1995, however, a subtle shift started in the official Uzbek attitude to the opposition 
as government officials entered a dialog with opposition activists at a US-sponsored conference 
on the political and economic situation in Uzbekistan. This shift was part of a larger reversal of 
official Uzbek attitudes to the world community. Uzbekistan began a diplomatic offensive to 
30 Izvestiya, February 28, 1996.
31 Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 15, 1996.
32 The Popular Democratic Party, the former Communists, won 69 seats, Vatan tarakkiyeti won 14, and 167 
deputies were elected without party identification. Interfax, January 27, 1995. Subsequently, some deputies 
declared their membership in other parties, so that in October 1995 the parliamentary daily Narodnoe slovo 
could claim that four parties were represented in the Olii Majlis. See Narodnoe slovo, October 27, 1995.
claim some of the foreign attention, and foreign investment, that had previously been directed 
largely to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.33 Karimov also saw the West, particularly the United 
States, as a valuable counterweight to a Russian Federation that was experiencing an upsurge of 
nationalism and where some politicians were raising the possibility that  the USSR might be 
reconstructed.34
There was surprisingly little Western reaction to the referendum in March 1995 on extending 
Karimov's term in office until 2000. The referendum had been proposed by the docile Olii Majlis, 
but the idea for extending the president's term to the end of the century almost certainly had 
originated with Karimov himself. Although the referendum gained the approval of 90% of the 
voters, a result that was reminiscent of Soviet-era election results, the most negative comments 
came from Russian democrats.
Although Western leaders and aid-givers recognized that  Uzbekistan was, and was likely to 
remain, a highly authoritarian state, the importance of the most populous state in Central Asia 
could not be ignored, especially since Uzbekistan declared that it shared to Western, especially 
US, fears that Iran would attempt to export its brand of anti-Western Islamic revolution to the 
new states of Central Asia.35
Karimov in turn recognized the value in small gestures to assuage Western concerns about the 
human rights situation in Uzbekistan, pardoning 85 opposition activists, including three leaders 
of the Erk Party, and allowing Western human rights organizations, including the New York-
based Helsinki Watch/Human Rights Watch, to open offices in Tashkent.36 The result was an 
immediate muting of the Western criticism of Uzbekistan's human rights record, and an upsurge 
of interest in the West in Uzbekistan as an important investment opportunity.37
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan's leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, has never sought to conceal his commitment to 
authoritarian rule. The last Communist Party chief of the republic before the collapse of the 
USSR, Niyazov asserts that his absolutism accords with the needs and traditions of the Turkmen 
people. There is little sign that significant numbers of Turkmenistan's inhabitants disagree with 
him, although some Turkmen intellectuals have indicated that they are embarrassed by Niyazov's 
personality cult that exceeds even that of Stalin.
In the last years of the USSR, Gorbachev's liberalizing trends barely touched Turkmenistan. An 
anti-corruption campaign in the late 1980s seemed to have been modeled on that in Uzbekistan, 
but it seemed to be more a settling of personal scores than an attempt to initiate even the mildest 
restructuring  of  administration in  the  republic.  Even after  independence,  Turkmenistan  has 
remained a country in which the Soviet mentality remains strong.
In the late 1980s, a tiny opposition group of intellectuals formed in Ashkhabad, the republican 
capital, and formed a branch in Mary, one of Turkmenistan's handful of cities. The group, known 
as Agzybirlik (Unity), was constantly harassed by law enforcement authorities and was never 
able to establish as much of a presence as did Birlik and Erk in Uzbekistan.
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37 Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 22, 1996. Izvestiya, August 5, 1995.
After the collapse of the USSR, Niyazov launched his personality cult in the name of solidifying 
a sense of national consciousness among Turkmen whose primary loyalty had always been to 
their clan or family. The highly traditional nature of Turkmen society probably provided some 
justification  for  Niyazov's  assertion  that  he  was  only  responding to  an  ancient  belief  that 
Turkmen value only the leader with the strongest hand. Certainly Niyazov has never feared to 
turn to the electorate to approve his wishes. Turkmenistan was the first Central Asian state in 
which the voters were asked to approve or reject the country's independence. They approved 
independence in October 1991 as overwhelmingly as they had approved the continued existence 
of the USSR the previous March. Turkmenistan was also the first Central Asian state to institute 
direct election of the president.
Almost every industrial enterprise, farm, school and army unit now bears Niyazov's name. Ap-
parently seeking to model himself on Ataturk, Niyazov has added to his name the designation 
"Turkmenbashi" (Father of the Turkmen), which is now the new name of the Caspian seaport of 
Krasnovodsk. But  Niyazov's authoritarian bent has not only spawned a  personality cult  that 
reaches the heights of absurdity.38 At the same time, he has ensured that there is no hint of po-
litical reform, and little sign of the introduction of a market economy.
In  January  1994,  Niyazov  started  the  practice,  subsequently  adopted  by  the  presidents  of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, of seeking to extend his term in office through a referendum. Ni-
yazov explained his request that the voters approve the cancellation of the presidential election 
scheduled for 1997 by saying that he needed at least ten years to put his plans for Turkmenistan 
into effect. According to official results that foreign human rights organizations did not even 
bother to challenge, 99.9% of Turkmenistan's electorate voted in favor of the president's pro-
posal.
Turkmenistan has been very eager to attract foreign investment in the expansion and moderni-
zation of its oil and gas industries. There has been no shortage of Western, Russian and Iranian 
firms that are interested in becoming involved in developing Turkmenistan's petroleum and gas 
resources, although the lack of legal protections could give some foreigners pause. On the whole, 
however, it is Turkmen who have been the main targets of Niyazov's heavy-handedness.
Most of the tiny Turkmen opposition that  evolved prior  to  the country's independence has 
emigrated, to Russia or the West. In 1994, the Turkmen security service enlisted its Russian 
counterparts to help round up opposition activists who were carrying on their attack on Niyazov's 
human rights record from Moscow. The Russian security service, on discovering that two of the 
persons they had arrested were employees of Radio Liberty, refused a Turkmen request to hand 
them over to Turkmen authorities.39 But two of the detainees, Muhametkuly Aymuradov and 
Hoshali Garaev, were extradited to Ashkhabat to face trial in June 1995 on charges of having 
planned the assassination of Niyazov. The two were sentenced to long prison terms despite the 
improbability of the charges against them. The most articulate spokesman for democratization in 
Turkmenistan is Niyazov's first foreign minister in the post-independence period, Avdy Kuliev, 
who carries on a  tireless campaign of propaganda against Niyazov from Moscow, where his 
Turkmenistan Fund seeks to promote human rights in his homeland.
In July 1995, between 300 and 500 people staged a demonstration in Ashkhabat against Niya-
zov's policies and calling for new elections. Security officials, at a loss to explain this outburst of 
popular anger at the Turkmen president, announced that the demonstrators were either drunk or 
high on drugs. Officials of the Moscow-based Turkmenistan Fund denied having had anything to 
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do with the demonstration, and some Russian journalists speculated that officials of the Russian 
government might have been involved in inciting the protest as a means to embarrass Niyazov 
after he refused to permit Russian military bases on Turkmen soil.
By 1996, Niyazov realized that foreign investment in Turkmenistan's oil and gas would not be 
enough to develop a modern economy. At the beginning of the year, he began promoting market 
reform, but insisted that it must take place without social dislocation and hardships.40 He insisted 
on retaining the free distribution to all citizens of Turkmenistan of water, gas and electricity, on 
which at least part of his apparent popularity is based. Turkmenistan was affected, as were all the 
former Soviet republics, by the breakdown of its economic relationships with the rest of the 
former USSR. It has tried to obtain consumer goods by arranging barter deals for its gas with 
Ukraine and other new states that are dependent on Turkmen gas to meet their energy needs. 
Some consumer items have been obtained from Turkey and Iran, but apparently their quality is 
poor.41
As Turkmenistan's economy becomes increasingly integrated with that  of the outside world, 
Niyazov may find that his inclination to govern the country like an absolutist oriental ruler im-
pedes the economic development that is the centerpiece of his prosperity plan. The Turkmen 
president, for all the apparent foolishness of his Stalinesque personality cult, may be a canny 
enough politician to realize this. It is significant that he has pardoned at least some of the par-
ticipants in the July 1995 protest in Ashkhabat.42
Tajikistan
In any discussion of post-Soviet authoritarianism in the new states of Central Asia, Tajikistan has 
a unique place because its existence as an independent country has been characterized almost 
exclusively by political instability and, for much of the time, civil war.
Tajikistan  declared its  independence at  the  beginning of September, 1991,  in  the  midst  of 
demonstrations  in  Dushanbe  by  anti-Communist  groups  trying  to  oust  President  Kakhar 
Makhkamov.  Opposition groups consisting of reform-minded Communists as  well  as  Tajik 
nationalists and supporters of the Tajik  branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party had tried in 
February, 1990, to force Makhkamov from office because of his failure, in their view, to institute 
real political or economic reform, although a number of independent political groups had been 
allowed to form in the capital, although the Islamic Renaissance Party had been banned since it 
was founded. Another major grievance against Makhkamov was that he represented the power of 
the Leninabad clique that had monopolized power in the republic for decades.
By September, 1991, three groups in opposition to the Communist Party had become established 
in Tajikistan. The oldest of these was the Rastokhez (Rebirth) Movement, which coalesced in the 
late 1980s around efforts by the Tajik intelligentsia to restore Tajikistan's cultural and linguistic 
heritage. Some of its leaders were heavily criticized in the Communist press for their role in the 
Dushanbe demonstrations in 1990, but neither they nor the reformist Communists who joined 
them were arrested for their actions, which amounted to trying to overthrow the republican 
leadership. At worst, they lost their jobs.
The other two opposition groups that took leading roles in the events of late 1991 and 1992 were 
the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, a grouping of intellectuals with a Western orientation that 
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was sometimes tinged with a  strong admiration for Iran. The largest and most influential of 
Tajikistan's opposition groups, because of its potential appeal to many segments of Tajik society 
that would like to see Islam restored to a primary place in Tajik life, was the Islamic Renaissance 
Party, which had had no better reception from the government of Tajikistan than its counterpart 
in Uzbekistan had received from the leadership there. The Islamic Party provided most of the 
demonstrators, who patiently assembled daily before the government building in Dushanbe until 
Makhkamov could take no more and resigned only a few days after the parliament declared 
Tajikistan independent.
Makhkamov was replaced by the parliament with his predecessor as Communist Party chief, 
another representative of the "Leninabad mafia" named Rakhman Nabiev, who had been re-
moved from power in 1985 because of his resistance to reform. The selection of Nabiev played a 
major role in precipitating the events that led to the outbreak of civil war in 1992, not least of all 
because Nabiev resisted all demands by the opposition for a share of power and the beginning of 
reform. In a popular presidential election at the end of 1992, filmmaker Davlat Khudonazarov, 
the candidate behind whom the opposition rallied, made a respectable showing but Nabiev gained 
the most votes. He took this as popular approval for his retention of Communist-era politics, and 
in March 1992 the demonstrations began again. The opposition demonstrations, calling for the 
democratization  of  Tajikistan,  and  counterdemonstrations  in  support  of  the  government, 
continued until  an  outbreak  of violence in  June frightened Nabiev into agreeing to  include 
several members of opposition groups, though not their leaders, in a "government of national 
reconciliation."
At that point, civil war broke out between opponents of the new government and the former 
opposition. Regional affiliations played at least as great a role in the fighting as did political ones. 
Opponents of the coalition government were centered in the Kulyab region in south-central 
Tajikistan and in the Hissar Valley west of Dushanbe; supporters of the non-Communist groups, 
in particular the Islamic Party, had their strongholds in the mountains east of Dushanbe, in the 
autonomous Badakhshan region in the southeast, and in the Kurgan-Tyube region that had been 
settled by migrants from the eastern mountains. The Leninabad region in the north, which had 
provided Tajikistan's leadership for decades, stayed out of the fighting although it  supported 
those who sought to dislodge the coalition.
At the end of 1992,  the coalition government resigned in an attempt to end the civil war. A 
government of former Communists took over power in Dushanbe, but has never been able to gain 
control of the entire country. Fighting has continued sporadically up to the present, as Islamic 
fighters based in Afghanistan have clashed with Russian and other CIS troops on the Tajik-
Afghan border, and opposition forces have continued the war against Tajik government troops in 
the mountains.43
Imomali Rakhmonov, a former collective farm chairman who took over as head of state at the 
end of 1992, was unable to crush the opposition with military force, even with massive Russian 
assistance, and in 1994 his Russian allies and United Nations representatives pressured him into 
starting peace talks with the opposition. Six rounds of inconclusive talks have taken place, the 
most recent ending on July 19, 1996.44 A cease-fire that was agreed at the latest round of talks 
apparently broke down almost immediately, as each side accused the other of violating it.
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After his accession to power, Rakhmonov was perceived in the West as little more than a former 
minor official who was part  of an  effort by former Communists to reclaim their  control of 
Tajikistan. But Rakhmonov has proved to be a more competent and flexible leader than many 
would have expected. He has successfully conducted parliamentary and presidential elections in 
the country, despite the continuing fighting. Although his opponent in the presidential election, 
the former Communist prime minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhonov, claimed that there had been 
massive fraud during the election, he did not challenge the outcome.45
The armed opposition was excluded from the presidential and parliamentary elections, although 
one of the partners in the opposition coalition, the Democratic Party, was subsequently legalized 
despite its refusal  to support the government.46 The three members of the 1992  coalition of 
opposition groups were banned in June 1993, and the ban remains in force against the Islamic 
Party, the most important opposition force in the country.47 The Rastokhez movement, almost all 
of the leaders of which have emigrated from Tajikistan, has recognized the Tajik constitution but 
has not had the ban on its activities lifted.48 It remains part of the united Tajik opposition along 
with the Islamic Renaissance Party, which continues to carry the burden of the fighting against 
the Tajik government. A handful of small parties has been registered in Dushanbe, but the main 
force in Tajikistan's legislature as well as its government remains the Communist Party.
Rakhmonov has declared for international consumption that he is committed to the eventual 
establishment of Western-style, secular democracy in Tajikistan. But under the conditions that 
exist at present in the country, with the government losing ground to the armed opposition 49 and 
unable to guarantee the loyalty of its own supporters,50 the possibility of democratization seems 
remote.
Conclusion
The most immediate challenge facing the new states of Central Asia is to put their economies in 
order, stopping the decline in living standards that could, in the view of most Central Asian 
political leaders, lead to social and political instability that could undermine their own power. 
Despite the efforts of Western countries to encourage democratization, top leaders in all  the 
Central Asian states see a strong presidency as the best way to ensure the controlled change that 
all of them, to a greater or lesser extent, consider to be necessary to achieve economic, social and 
political stability, as well as to ensure the sovereignty of their countries.
The  shift in  Western emphasis from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to  the more authoritarian 
Uzbekistan suggests that political decision-makers and diplomats outside Central Asia are ac-
cepting, at least to some extent, the arguments of Central Asian leaders concerning the necessity 
for a strong hand to guide the modernization and state-building processes in these countries. The 
result of this reasoning, however, may be that the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two 
states in which stirrings of democratization on the Western model were most pronounced, are 
encouraged  to  follow the  path  of  greater  authoritarianism,  as  exemplified  by  Uzbekistan's 
45 Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 28, 1994 and Interfax, November 7, 1994.
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50 At the beginning of 1996, Rakhmonov was faced with an armed rebellion by some of his former supporters in 
the south. See Novoe vremya, No. 5, 1996, p. 16.
President Karimov, rather than returning to the path of democratization on which they seemed to 
have embarked.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
The newly independent states of Central Asia were expected after the breakup of the USSR to be 
prone to instability and violence, but four years of independence have shown them, with the 
exception of Tajikistan, to be among the most stable of the Soviet successor states. Those Central 
Asian leaders who consider the maintenance of political and social stability to have priority over 
reform consider  that  events  have  justified  their  choice.  The  presidents  of  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan, who attempted to introduce democratization, have become more authoritarian in 
order to carry out their reform programs.
The need for stability is grounded in the absence of any experience of Western-style democracy 
and in the lack of a tradition of statehood in Central Asia, although national consciousness was 
well advanced among the Central Asian political and cultural elite prior to the disintegration of 
the USSR.
Westerners who expected that democracy would take root rapidly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have been disappointed as the leaders of those countries have become more authoritarian. At the 
same  time,  interest  in  authoritarian  Uzbekistan  has  increased  as  the  West  recognizes  the 
geopolitical importance of that country.
Findings
1. In Kazakhstan, democratization was given impetus by the events of December 1986 in Alma-
Ata. In the late 1980s, the first signs of a civil society emerged in Kazakhstan, the first 
Central  Asian republic in which public organizations independent of the Communist 
Party  were  allowed  to  function.  Prior  to  Kazakhstan's  independence,  its  president, 
Nursultan  Nazarbaev,  had  acquired  the  reputation  of  being  a  leader  committed  to 
democratization and  economic liberalization.  But  in  the  four  years  of  the  country's 
independence, the effects of reform have created social stress and a rising crime rate. 
Kazakhstan's political  parties remain  largely irrelevant in  the country's political  life. 
Nazarbaev considered that his reforms were being thwarted by the Constitutional Court 
and an uncooperative parliament. In the wake of his dissolution of parliament in 1995, 
Nazarbaev ruled by decree, replacing Kazakhstan's first post-Soviet constitution with one 
that  gave  the  presidency  vastly  increased  powers  but  was  widely  denounced  as 
undemocratic. The Kazakh president further disappointed those who had considered him 
a  proponent  of  democracy  when  he  allowed his  term in  office  to  be  extended by 
referendum. Due  to  his elimination of legislative and judicial  checks on his power, 
Nazarbaev gained the reputation of being an authoritarian ruler similar to his counterpart 
in Uzbekistan.
2. Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akaev began the process of democratization before the breakup 
of the USSR. But  after  the country gained its  independence, the president came in-
creasingly into conflict with the parliament, which was unwilling to support his economic 
reforms. When Akaev tried to persuade non-Kyrgyz not to emigrate from the country, he 
was criticized by the Kyrgyz nationalists who had previously supported him. The antago-
nism between the president and the parliament came to a head in 1994, when Akaev dis-
solved the legislature. Akaev's actions in limiting freedom of the press and preventing a 
challenge during the presidential  election in 1995  have tarnished his reputation as a 
leader committed to democratization.
3. Uzbekistan began its existence as an independent state under an authoritarian regime, be-
cause  its  president,  Islam  Karimov,  values  stability  above  reform.  Uzbekistan  had 
developed  a  political  opposition  before  the  country  gained  independence,  but  the 
opposition has been subject to varying degrees of repression for most of its existence. 
Arrests and treason trials of political activists gave Uzbekistan a bad name in the West, 
which affected Uzbek efforts to develop diplomatic ties. A skillful politician, Karimov 
has overcome much Western antipathy to his human rights record by supporting Western 
initiatives against Iran, and beginning a  slow privatization in order to court Western 
investment.
4. Turkmenistan's leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, who styles himself "Turkmenbashi" - Father of 
the Turkmen - has never claimed to be a democrat. He justifies his authoritarian rule and 
outrageous personality cult  by citing oriental  tradition. Political  opposition has been 
almost non-existent in Turkmenistan, so a demonstration by several hundred people in 
Ashkhabat in 1995 came as a considerable surprise. Niyazov was the first Central Asian 
head of state to dispense with the necessity of facing a presidential election, though he has 
always been certain that the voters would carry out his wishes.
5. Tajikistan has been in a state of civil war for most of its existence as an independent state. 
The most important opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance, is conducting armed resis-
tance to the government of President Imomali Rakhmonov, a former Communist official. 
Although Rakhmonov's government rejects the label "Communist," the Communist Party 
remains the dominant political force in that part of the country under government control. 
Rakhmonov asserts that he wants to create a secular, democratic state, but the continuing 
civil war has ensured that major segments of the opposition remain excluded from Tajiki-
stan's political life.
